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Abstract —Current network security systems are progressively 
showing their limitations. One credible estimate is that only 
about 45% of new threats are detected. Therefore it is vital to 
find a new direction that cybersecurity development should 
follow. We argue that the next generation of cybersecurity 
systems should seek inspiration in nature. This approach has 
been used before in the first generation of cybersecurity 
systems; however, since then cyber threats and environment 
have evolved significantly, and accordingly the first-generation 
systems have lost their effectiveness. A next generation of bio-
inspired cybersecurity research is emerging, but progress is 
hindered by the lack of a framework for mapping biological 
security systems to their cyber analogies. In this paper, using 
terminology and concepts from biology, we describe a 
cybersecurity ecology and a framework that may be used to 
systematically research and develop bio-inspired 
cybersecurity. 
Keywords: bio-inspired cybersecurity, cybersecurity ecology, bio-
mimetic systems, cyber-ecosystem. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is estimated that current commercially available anti-
virus products are able to detect only 45% of the new threats 
that Internet users face each day [1]. Moreover, the number 
and functionality of malicious software utilized by 
cybercriminals, as well as its sophistication and complexity, 
is constantly increasing. As a result, the average length of 
time between initial injection of a threat into the network 
and its discovery is increasing every year, and is now 
measured in months (according to Verizon’s “2014 Data 
Breach Investigations Report”), if not years.  Additionally, 
current defense systems are largely static and not sufficiently 
adaptable to cope with the attackers’ changing tools and 
tactics. The inability to provide trusted secure services in 
contemporary communication networks could potentially 
have a tremendous socio-economic impact on both E2E and 
E2C global markets. Because currently available cyber 
defenses are progressively showing their limitations, it is 
imperative to find a new direction for cybersecurity research 
and development to follow. 
We propose that the network security community should 
look into nature for new approaches to cybersecurity, both 
offensive and defensive. Current and future cybersecurity 
solutions should be designed, developed, and deployed in a 
way that will fully leverage the experience, learning, and 
knowledge from on-going biological evolution.  Conversely, 
the community should also look to nature to anticipate how 
the threat may evolve, and respond accordingly.  
The most notable pros and cons of the bio-inspired 
cybersecurity approach are detailed below.  
First, nature has over 3.8 billion years of experience in 
developing solutions and adaptations to the challenges that 
organisms face living in extremely diverse environmental 
conditions. The estimated number of (largely undiscovered) 
species is tens of millions, and each of them possesses 
specific and unique traits facilitating survival and 
propagation of their own genes. The key process of living 
organisms that has led to the persistence of the most 
successful forms and behaviors is evolution. Evolution has 
developed optimal solutions for situations analogous to the 
threats faced by computer network systems. 
Second, for ages people have sought inspiration from 
nature. Some relevant modern examples include biomimicry, 
which is the inspiration of such inventions as Velcro tape 
and "cat's eyes" (retroreflective road markings). Computer 
science has also taken a page out of nature’s book by 
developing biologically inspired techniques like genetic 
algorithms, neural and sensor networks, etc.  Although at 
first glance there may not appear to be a direct relationship 
between cybersecurity and the patterns present in nature, 
closer inspection reveals that the essence of most known 
Internet attacks and defence mechanisms has analogies in 
nature.  For example the Kudzu vine is able to penetrate its 
ecosystem with an astounding speed of ca. 30cm/day. 
Within a short time it can choke all other vegetation, 
including trees and shrubs, by blocking access to the 
resources necessary for survival – light and nutrients. The 
essence is just like in DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) 
attacks for communication networks where legitimate users 
are deprived of the resources that they are entitled to like 
access to the service, bandwidth, CPU time, etc. Similar 
analogies can be drawn for other offensive techniques as 
well as for security solutions, as observed and described in 
[2]. 
Another powerful analogy is the “arms race” (a form of a 
coevolution involving an aggressor developing its offensive 
mechanisms and a victim/host evolving countermeasures in 
the form of defensive barriers). “Arms race” is often 
observed between e.g. predators and prey in nature.  Similar 
dynamics can be also found in interactions involving hosts 
and parasites, with the former constantly trying to invade 
host bodies and the latter constantly evolving 
countermeasures preventing the invasion. Both the 
abovementioned cases bear many resemblances with a 
“malware-security systems” scenario (or more generally 
“attackers-defenders”) where there is a continual contention 
to develop offensive/defensive measures as fast as possible 
to at least temporarily dominate the other side. Thus, it is 
readily apparent that in both nature and cyber world, entities 
must evolve permanently and adapt to ever-changing 
environments.  In biology this phenomenon – an organism’s 
need to continually adapt and evolve to avoid extinction – is 
called the Red Queen hypothesis [19].  It was named after a 
character from Lewis Carroll’s book "Through the Looking-
Glass". In this book the Red Queen described her country as 
a place where “…it takes all the running you can do, to keep 
in the same place”. Exactly the same process can be 
observed in cybersecurity and in biological systems where 
there is a constant need for adaptation of offensive/defensive 
techniques to maintain a certain level of adaptation 
permitting survival and reproduction/propagation. 
Bio-inspired cybersecurity is not a new idea.  The first 
generations of cybersecurity research were bio-inspired, e.g., 
the immune system inspired defense methods based on 
signature analysis, as well as methods for handling 
polymorphic threats (which are analogous to, e.g., different 
influenza strains).  Since then, however, the threats have 
evolved to make these first-generation defenses less 
effective.  In order to survive, cybersecurity must be 
evolved/adapted accordingly to counter the new threats.  A 
next generation of bio-inspired cybersecurity research is now 
emerging; however, we find the knowledge and 
achievements to be scattered because the field lacks a 
framework.  This paper aims at filling this gap by defining, 
based on the terminology and concepts known from biology, 
the cybersecurity ecology (and related terms). This 
cybersecurity ecology will enable a rigorous analysis of the 
existing relationships between entities in the cybersecurity 
ecosystem.  Such a systematic view of cybersecurity will 
allow the research community to analyze and compare 
biological organisms’ interactions with those from the 
virtual world in order to identify differences, deficits and 
potentially new promising approaches to cybersecurity. 
We need to be cautious, however, that the mappings 
from nature to the cyber world are not always “1-to-1”, i.e., 
the analogies are not always perfect. Some of the reasons 
that exact mappings are not always possible include:  
 Many mechanisms and relationships in nature are very 
complex and not yet understood sufficiently to correctly 
map them to the virtual world; 
 In nature, individual organisms within a species are 
disposable, and death is a critical driver of evolutionary 
adaptation; but for many security-critical systems (e.g. 
military, utilities, and other critical infrastructure) any 
loss, compromise, or corruption is unacceptable;  
 The main goal for any organism is to survive and 
reproduce, whereas our computers / networks have many 
different goals (specific tasks and functions). 
 
Despite these imperfect mappings we strongly believe 
that there are still many important lessons from nature that 
can benefit and improve cybersecurity. Moreover, if we 
follow a Sapir-Whorf hypothesis [31], which states that  
language has a direct impact on thoughts, then finding 
analogies between cybersecurity and nature with its 
accompanying terminology, concepts and solutions can have 
a tremendous impact on the way we think about solving 
cybersecurity problems.  New mechanisms and ideas may 
emerge. Therefore, the systematic view for bio-inspired 
cybersecurity that we are proposing should help to unveil 
new promising directions that could be pursued to discover 
and develop effective next-generation security solutions.  
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
summarizes the state-of-the-art in bio-inspired cybersecurity. 
In Section 3 the analogy between the biology-based 
ecosystem and the cyber-ecosystem, including potential 
interactions, is drawn. Section 4 describes some promising 
research directions for cybersecurity. Finally, the last section 
concludes our work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The existing literature includes many attempts to map 
biological concepts to cybersecurity.  And, many of these 
attempts have successfully transitioned to cybersecurity 
technologies and systems in common use nowadays, 
including anti-virus, intrusion detection, threat behavior 
analysis, honeypots, counterattack, etc. [2]. As already 
mentioned in the previous section, current research on bio-
inspired cybersecurity is fragmented and lacks a systematic 
approach.  A primary cause is the diversity of aspects from 
nature that can be used as inspiration for cybersecurity 
research. Current research may be broadly segmented into 
two groups, depending on how an inspiration is drawn: 
 when inspiration is drawn from a given organism’s 
characteristic feature/defense mechanism (internal or 
external). Internal mechanisms include, for example, an 
immune system.  External mechanisms include e.g. 
various camouflage and mimicry techniques; 
 when inspiration is drawn from various inter-organism 
interactions – this includes, e.g., predator-prey 
associations. 
 
2.1 Bio-inspired cybersecurity inspired by an organism’s 
characteristic feature/defense mechanism 
In order to effectively avoid detection/observation an 
organism can hide or conceal its presence by using 
camouflage or mimicry techniques that modify the 
organism’s external appearance [17]. 
Camouflage embraces all solutions that utilize 
individual’s physical shape, texture, coloration, illumination, 
etc. to make animals difficult to spot. This causes the 
information about their exact location to remain ambiguous. 
Examples of animals that can easily blend into the 
background include the chameleon (family Chameleonidae) 
which can shift its skin color to make it similar to ambient 
lighting and background coloration; stick and leaf insects 
(order Phasmotodea) that take the physical form of a 
wooden stick or a leaf; orchid mantis (Hymenopus 
coronatus) that resembles a tropical orchid which, although 
quite conspicuous, is difficult to detect against a background 
of developed flowers.  Camouflage often occurs on levels 
other than visual recognition: e.g., many viruses code 
pathways and molecular signaling systems that mimic host 
cell transduction mechanisms – by doing so the virus can 
easily invade the cell and take control of the metabolism and 
immunological system of an individual [20].  In cyber space 
various information hiding techniques, e.g. steganography, 
can be utilized to provide means to hide the location of 
confidential data within an innocent-looking carrier or to 
otherwise enable covert communication across 
communication networks [18]. 
Patterns and/or colorations can be also used to confuse 
the predator, i.e., to make information about the prey hard to 
interpret. Such so-called “disruptive” camouflage is possible 
and can be seen in, e.g., a herd of zebras (Equus quagga) 
where it is difficult for an attacking lion to identify a single 
animal in a herd when they flee in panic. Patterns of 
contrasting stripes purportedly degrade an observer’s ability 
to judge the speed and direction of moving prey, and they do 
so by exploiting specific mechanisms associated with the 
way brain processes visual information on movement [21].  
An analogous idea is utilized by various moving target 
techniques/defense in cyberspace, which distribute the 
uncertainty between the attacker and the defender more 
fairly. For example, some first-generation solutions made 
periodic changes in a host’s appearance from the network 
perspective, in order to mitigate the effectiveness of target 
reconnaissance [8]. Second-generation solutions include, 
e.g., an ant-based cyber defense which is a mobile resilient 
security system that removes attackers’ ability to rely on 
prior experience, without requiring motion in the protected 
infrastructure [12]. 
Mimicry characterizes the cases in which an organism’s 
attributes are obfuscated by adopting the characteristics of 
another living organism. In particular, this means that the 
prey can avoid attack by making the predator believe it is 
something else, e.g., a harmless species can mimic a 
dangerous one.  The prey hides information about its own 
identity by impersonating something that it is not. For 
example, harmless milk snakes (Lampropeltis sp.) mimic 
venomous coral snakes (Micrurus sp.) to confuse predators 
which are less likely to launch an attack in expectation of a 
venomous harmful bite. Cybersecurity solutions that utilize 
the same idea include various traffic type obfuscation 
techniques, e.g., traffic morphing [16]. 
Organisms’ internal systems may also inspire new 
cybersecurity approaches.  There are many recent studies 
attempting to map features and functions of the human 
immune system to cyber space [3, 9, 10, 11]. Immune 
systems use a diversity of receptors to detect external 
antigens (alien proteins).  These variations are not inherited 
but instead are generated via recombination in the process of 
V(D)J (somatic) recombination, which generates repertoires 
of receptors undergoing clonal selection and reinforcement – 
preparing them for effective action against antigens, with the 
lowest possible level of autoagression (e.g. reaction against 
an organism’s own proteins) [22]. The resultant Artificial 
Immune Systems (AIS) are designed to mimic certain 
properties of the natural immune system. In cybersecurity 
their main application is anomaly and misbehavior detection. 
AIS typically rely on one of four major paradigms: (i) 
negative selection algorithm [3]; (ii) clonal selection 
algorithm [9]; (iii) dendritic cell algorithm [10] or (iv) 
idiotypic networks models algorithms [11]. The first 
generation AIS (i and ii) utilized only simple models of 
human immune systems, so the resulting performance was 
not comparable with its human counterpart. Recent AIS (iii 
and iv) are more rigorous and better correspond to natural 
immune systems. 
 
2.2 Bio-inspired cybersecurity inspired by organisms’ 
interactions  
In nature, there are many interactions between organisms 
that potentially may serve as inspirations for cybersecurity. 
For example, several studies focus on various aspects of 
predator-prey associations. In [13] the authors make the 
predator-prey analogy for the Internet and investigate how 
different levels of species diversification can serve as a 
defensive measure.  They considered each type of a 
vulnerable device as a heterogeneous species and 
investigated what level of species diversification is 
necessary to prevent a malicious attack from causing a 
failure to the entire network.  Subsequently, in [5] it was 
discovered that the cost to the predator in seeking its prey 
drastically impacts the predation process. In particular it has 
been observed that even fairly simple strategies for raising 
the cost of predation can result in significant reduction in 
outbreak size. Other studies utilize biological models of 
epidemic spreading (a special case of antagonistic 
interaction between the pathogen and the victim) to predict 
or analyze malware outbreaks [14], [15].  
Finally, the relationships and interactions between 
existing malware (so called malware ecology) have been 
investigated in [6]. Numbers of interactions, both accidental 
and intentional, between different types of malware were 
analyzed and the main conclusion was to seek ecologically-
inspired defense techniques, because many ideas from 
ecology can be directly applied to all aspects of malware 
defense.  
From the studies presented above we can conclude that 
bio-inspired cybersecurity is a wide, diverse, emerging, and 
evolving research field.  However, from the research 
perspective, we see many “loose ends” that need to be tied 
by using a more systematic approach, which we next 
propose. 
III. CYBERSECURITY ECOLOGY 
In this section, first we systematically review the key 
terms from biology related to ecology. Then by borrowing 
and adjusting the original biology-based definitions, we will 
describe the most important components of cyber-ecosystem 
and then of cybersecurity ecology.  
 
3.1 Cyber-ecosystem 
In biology the term ecology is defined as the field of life 
sciences analyzing and studying interactions among 
organisms and/or their environment. This means that it deals 
with the structure and functioning of ecosystems. An 
ecosystem is defined as a community of living organisms 
(biotic components) together with the nonliving (abiotic) 
components of their environment that interact as a system. 
Apart from the biotic and abiotic components, 
interconnected by various interactions, the ecosystem is 
fueled by energy, usually in the form of electromagnetic 
radiation (if production in an ecosystem is sun-driven, i.e. 
accomplished by green plants) and chemical energy (if an 
ecosystem relies on chemosynthetic bacteria). Both biotic 
and abiotic factors can influence an organism. For example, 
climate change or an atypically large number of predators 
can negatively impact some species [23]. 
 In every ecosystem the energy flow is crucial as each 
ecosystem is energy-based and is capable of transforming, 
accumulating, and circulating energy. In nature the flow of 
energy is encapsulated in a food chain, and a concept of 
trophic levels is utilized to illustrate the position that an 
organism occupies in a food chain (Fig. 1, left). Depending 
on how energy is obtained, two groups of organisms can be 
distinguished: producers (that are able to manufacture their 
own food using inorganic components and 
chemical/radiation energy) and consumers (that feed on 
producers and/or other consumers) [24]. 
 Ecology can be viewed as one of the approaches to study 
complex and dynamic systems. Thus, if we are able to 
understand how ecosystems and related concepts map to the 
cybersecurity field then the usefulness of various ecological 
methodologies can be evaluated. If such mappings are 
successful then application of many mathematical ecological 
systems models to cyber systems can be investigated. 
 
 Based on the above terms and definitions from ecology, 
we want to systematically recreate an analogous taxonomy 
for the cyber world.  
 Let us define cyber-ecosystem as a community of cyber-
organisms i.e. non-human actors e.g. applications, processes, 
programs, defensive and offensive systems (analogues to the 
biotic components) that interact between themselves and 
with the environment (abiotic components). Let us also 
assume that the environment in which biotic components 
reside and interact is a communication network, e.g. the 
Internet, and it constitutes a nonliving (abiotic) component 
with its hardware, links and interconnections.  
 In the cyber-ecosystem (the same as in nature) both 
biotic and abiotic factors can impact a cyber-organism. For 
example, malicious software can be utilized to compromise 
a user’s device defenses and steal his/her confidential data. 
On the other hand a failure of the link/networking device or 
network congestion influence a cyber-organism’s ability to 
communicate and exchange information. 
 In such a defined cyber-ecosystem we are particularly 
interested in the network of interactions among cyber-
organisms, and between cyber-organisms and their 
environment. 
 As mentioned above, in nature the key resource is 
energy. In communication networks, the analogous key 
resource is different kinds of information, including user 
personal or user-generated data, but also information about 
his/her behavior. In such a cyber-ecosystem, information can 
be transformed, accumulated, and/or circulated (similar to 
energy in ecosystems). 
 To have more clear analogies between ecosystems and 
cyber-ecosystems the role of the humans in the present 
context is constrained to these roles: 
 Producers which possess and generate information that 
forms a desirable resource for the consumers (e.g. the 
tools that attackers or digital marketing companies use to 
obtain desired information). 
 Components of the offensive/defensive solutions. For 
example, a bot herder typically issues command to the 
bot that he controls so he is an inevitable “part” of the 
botnet. Another example is an ID/PS (Intrusion 
Detection/Prevention System) which is configured and 
monitored by a security specialist.  
 A part of “evolutionary force”. Humans influence cyber-
organisms by changing their code, functionalities and 
applications. In this way an evolution is achieved. 
Typically, attackers try to outwit the defenders by 
developing malicious software that will be capable of 
overcoming existing defense mechanisms/systems. 
Conversely, defenders develop their defenses to be 
“immune” to the existing threats. Thus, both sides are 
taking part in a cyber “arms race”. 
 
Considering the above, it is possible also for the cyber 
world to characterize certain “cyber food chains” and/or 
cyber-trophic levels (Fig. 1, right). Consumers can 
become cyber-predator (attacker) or cyber-prey 
(defender) depending on the location in the cyber food 
chain. Producers always take the role of cyber-prey. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Food chains and trophic levels in an exemplary ecosystem 
(left) and a cyber-ecosystem (right). 
 
3.2 Cyber-ecology and its subtypes 
By means of a simple analogy we can define the following 
terms that rigorously describe the toolbox of cybersecurity 
ecology: 
 Cyber Ecology (CE) as a field that analyzes and studies 
interaction among cyber-organisms and/or their 
environment. 
 Cybersecurity Ecology (CSE) analyzes and studies 
interactions among cyber-organisms and between cyber-
organisms and their environment that influence their 
security. CSE is a subfield of CE. 
 Attacker–Defender Ecology (ADE) describes interactions 
between cyber-organisms which take roles of attackers 
and defenders in the specific cyber-ecosystem (e.g. in the 
Internet). As noted before such relationship can be 
regarded not only as predation but also as parasitism. It is 
also worth noting that such interactions reside in 
different locations of the cyber food chain and depend on 
the trophic level (Fig. 1). ADE is a part of CSE. 
 Attackers Ecology (AE) illustrates interactions between 
attackers (cyber-organisms) in a given cyber-ecosystem. 
The possible interactions encompass both antagonistic 
and non-antagonistic ones and depend on the context. 
Attackers can predate or parasite on each other, but the 
relationship can be of a symbiotic or a cooperative 
nature. AE is a part of CSE. 
 Defenders Ecology (DE) provides insights into potential 
interactions between the defenders (cyber-organisms), 
and it incorporates mostly non-antagonistic ones. It 
includes both external defense mechanisms (interactions 
of malware and defense systems resulting in defense) 
and internal properties (analogous to animal immune 
systems). DE is a part of CSE. 
 
The abovementioned terms e.g. AE can be further divided 
into e.g. malware ecology, botnet ecology, etc. The 
relationships between the terms defined in this and in 
previous sections are illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Main components and interactions in a cyber-ecosystem 
(Interactions: 1-predation, 2-parasitism, 3-symbiosis, 4-
cooperation, 5-sexual interactions, 6-competition). 
 
3.3 Cyber-ecosystem interactions 
The structure and stability of an ecosystem in nature is 
determined by the set of interactions that interconnect 
different entities. Interactions can be roughly classified into 
antagonistic interactions (between species; mainly predation 
and parasitism), non-antagonistic interactions (between and 
within species; cooperation, symbiosis) and sexual selection-
driven interactions (within species). In all three classes, 
interacting entities coevolve, responding reciprocally to their 
current states in a positive/negative feedback loop 
mechanism (also known as the arms-race dynamics for 
antagonistic interactions) [23]. The interactions can be 
defined as follows: 
 predation: a way of obtaining resources by killing/eating 
bodies of other organisms; results in the death of the 
prey; predation involves complex cycles of prey and 
predator abundances described by mathematical models 
such as the Lotka-Volterra equations system ([23], [25]), 
which can be utilized to design the most optimal 
strategies of defense or offense, depending on which side 
of the predation-prey system the focal cyber-organism 
currently is. In communication networks ransomware 
can be treated as a predator as it is “killing” the host by 
encrypting vital information it stores and unless the 
ransom is paid this resource is “destroyed/lost” i.e. user’s 
data cannot be retrieved; 
 parasitism: interaction involving obtaining resources by 
eating other entities but not killing them [23], [25]; it 
gave rise to a fruitful field of epidemiological 
parasitology, with mathematical models and defense 
systems that could be directly implemented in the 
context of cyber-epidemics. As already mentioned the 
current trend, especially for sophisticated malware such 
as Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), is more similar 
to a parasite-host scenario than a predation-prey one. It 
means that it is more likely that the malicious software 
will be active on an infected host for a long time and 
obtaining its resources in a transparent manner; 
 symbiosis: positive interaction involving obligatory 
interaction of two or more entities, necessary for all 
parties for survival and successful propagation. In 
cybersecurity this could include analysis of both 
attackers and defenders symbiosis. For example, for 
malware infection scenario it is common that the first 
infection is initially performed by exploiting some 
vulnerability on the host machine and this allows later 
for the second part of malware to be downloaded and 
executed in order to perform malicious actions for the 
cybercriminal; 
 cooperation: facultative interaction of an individual 
within one species or members of different species, 
increasing the fitness and survival of other individuals 
(the acceptors of cooperation) often at the cost of the 
focal individual (the giver of cooperative behavior) [23], 
[26], [27]; in communication networks cooperation 
should be recognized not only as a way of reinforcing 
defense mechanisms but also as a potential threat (a 
deceiver malware might exploit cooperating inclination 
of the system, wreaking havoc in its structures).  A 
recent real-world example is the sharing of cyber threat 
indicators as prescribed in the US Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act of 2015; 
 sexual interactions: occur exclusively within species and 
are channeled toward combining, in the most desired and 
effective way, the genes of females and males so that 
they maximize the fitness of offspring [28]; from the 
point of view of cyber-ecosystems the models of sexual 
selection based on compatible genes [29] are particularly 
interesting as they may serve as mechanisms for 
producing dynamic sets of the most optimal 
combinations of entities and their mutations that provide 
maximum protection against evolving malware. 
Moreover, using knowledge of how sexual selection 
works, it may be interesting to study how to become the 
most “unattractive” victim to the potential attacker. 
 competition: this relationship is symmetrical and 
involves both organisms competing for the same pool of 
resources. Inherently the relationship between organisms 
can be broken without any harm to neither of the sides – 
as both influences are negative their cessation benefits 
both competitors. In communication network 
environment this interaction can occur e.g. between two 
types of malware trying to infect the same host – when 
one of them succeeds it tries to “secure” the host by 
patching the exploit used by the other type of malicious 
software. Competition can also occur between defenders 
when few similar defense systems (e.g. anti-virus 
software) are run together and they impact each other in 
a negative way. 
 
 A point of view of cyber-ecology may be to treat these 
interactions as purely mechanistic descriptions of cyber-
systems – without looking at the consequences of 
interactions themselves and on the dynamics they describe. 
However, growing evidence suggests that the interactions 
not only influence the fitness and performance of entities but 
also significantly modify their physiology/performance in 
the interaction, altering the outcome of competition/synergy 
[30]. Such elastic responses of interacting entities to the 
interaction itself may have a significant role in cyber-
ecosystems, as they may serve to design more efficient ways 
of controlling cyber-ecosystems and reacting to unknown, 
emerging threats. 
As indicated in Section II, existing work focuses mainly 
on predator-prey association. However, an interesting 
observation is that the relationship between current malware 
and host is in essence closer to parasitism than to predation. 
This means that the goal of the current malware is to live off 
the infected host (and the longer it remains undetected, the 
better) but not to immediately cause significant harm or 
permanent damage.  
In the following section we will review the most 
important natural-enemy ecology models including 
parasitism models, and we will assess how this knowledge 
can be used for cybersecurity purposes. 
IV. NATURAL ENEMY ECOLOGY IN NATURE – UNIFYING 
ANTAGONISTIC INTERACTIONS 
The field of antagonistic interactions in ecological studies 
has so far been dominated by a very sharp distinction 
between predator-prey interactions and parasite-host 
interactions. As pointed out recently such interactions are, 
however, much closer to each other, and together with a 
third class (competition) form a unified group of 
antagonistic interactions involving the aggressor, the victim 
and resources that are/may be available to one or both 
entities [32]. This has led to the emergence of a new field-
of-study in ecology, which is broadly termed “natural enemy 
ecology”, and encompasses all interactions involving 
detrimental effects of one organism on another, be it a direct 
or indirect (e.g. via shared resources) effect. In this section 
we discuss consequences of such a categorization and 
review the most prominent models of antagonistic 
interactions, while pinpointing their weaknesses [32]. 
 
4.1. Similarities between parasitic and predatory 
interactions 
The strong distinction between parasitic and predatory 
relationships results mostly from an old methodology of 
categorizing nature [33]. In fact, all kinds of antagonistic 
ecological interactions (predation, parasitism and 
competition) share a common suite of components, which 
differ only in the strength/presence/direct character of the 
specific connections. All interactions involve conventionally 
at least two organisms (aggressor and victim, or two 
competitors in the competition model) that influence each 
other positively and/or negatively, and use each others’ 
resources [32]. 
 
Competition: the least antagonistic of all interactions; the 
roles of the interacting organisms are indistinguishable and 
both exert mutually negative influence on the other. The 
relationship is symmetrical and involves both organisms 
competing for the same pool of resources. Inherently the 
relationship between organisms can be broken without any 
harm done to neither of the sides: as both influences are 
negative their cessation benefits both competitors [32]. 
 
Predation: occurs when the aggressor kills the victim 
directly and feeds on its tissue – therefore it is inherently 
asymmetrical; predation involves very short time-scales, 
much shorter than timescales necessary for the evolution of 
low-level (molecular, immunological) defense mechanisms 
and, thus, prey evolves defenses in such system mostly at the 
higher, organismal (e.g. morphology and behavior) level 
[34]. Instead of immunological mechanisms prey benefits 
more by evolving learning-like mechanisms that are much 
more flexible on one hand and can evolve within long 
generation times on the other hand. Because predators 
consume their victims, they are regarded as residing on a 
different, higher trophic level than prey [32]. 
 
Parasitism: in this form of interaction the aggressor feeds 
on the victim but does not kill it. Predatory interactions are 
inherently fatal whereas parasitic interactions have led to the 
phenomenon of intermediate virulence, which maximizes 
parasite transmission to other hosts. The relationship 
between parasites and hosts is much more intimate and 
occurs at time-scales and generation times that allow the 
evolution of complex genetic (e.g. bacterial Crispr-Cas [35]) 
and immunological (e.g. vertebrate acquired immunity, 
invertebrate Toll receptors) defense mechanisms in 
victims/hosts. 
 
It is clear that all three relationships are slightly different 
and involve different levels of inter-organismal contact. 
However they all draw from the same population processes 
related to population growth and decline. Moreover, 
sometimes parasitism and predation are hard to delineate.  
For example, caterpillars feeding on plants could be 
regarded as predators, but they do not kill their victims and 
dwell on the surface of victim, as ectoparasites.  Mosquitos 
feed on the tissues of their victims (like parasites) but apart 
from this they display many properties of predators (longer 
generation time, short interaction timescale, high turnover 
rate of attacked victims). Recent literature has also pointed 
out that although seemingly different, parasitic and 
predatory interactions may give rise to similar ecological 
patterns. Some prominent examples include: 
 The evolution of inducible defenses and attack 
anticipation [36]: predation is often associated with 
behaviors and traits that are active and use resources only 
in the presence of predators – similar mechanisms may 
be present in the parasite-host systems where organismal 
systems (e.g. immunological) may optimize their activity 
window to match the activity window of aggressors, 
 Enemy-mediated facilitation [37]: in the presence of 
more than one aggressor, host/prey communities may 
evolve mechanisms that make use of prey-specific 
resistance to aggressors and indirect ecological effects 
that result from variation in prey/host susceptibility to 
aggressors, 
 Managing the threshold of transmission: in parasite-host 
systems there are specific host densities below which 
parasites are unable to effectively spread and persist; a 
similar concept might be applied to the predator-prey 
systems, where by managing the densities of particular 
predators (“superpredators” that affect prey densities the 
most) the population may be maintained at a desired 
level of prey density, avoiding extinction due to random 
fluctuations in predation pressures [32]. 
 
4.2. Models of antagonistic interactions 
The ecological literature has developed a number of 
mathematical descriptions of the predator-prey or parasite-
host interactions and not surprisingly, and in line with the 
abovementioned unifying considerations, all these models 
can be adjusted for the description of both predation and 
parasitism interactions. The most prominent and the oldest 
model is the Lotka-Volterra (L-V) model [33] that binds 
together aggressor and victim densities and models changes 
in these densities according to an assumed 
predation/parasitism rate. The model is defined using a 
system of two differential equations:  
 
𝑑𝑥
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑟𝑥 − 𝑎𝑦𝑥 
 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑡
= −𝑟′𝑦 + 𝑎′𝑥𝑦 
 
where x and y denote prey and predator densities, r and r’ 
describe population growth/decline of prey/predator 
populations, whereas a/a’ quantify the rate of encounters 
between prey and predators. The solution of this system 
describes the oscillatory behavior of prey and predator 
densities. The L-V model was quickly considered simplistic 
(e.g. the assumption of constant encounter rates a/a’ was 
considered as biologically unrealistic) and a number of other 
models have been developed. However, ecologists agree that 
all available models are just special cases of the L-V model, 
which in turn still remains the most important model for 
antagonistic interactions among organisms [33]. 
The models that followed the L-V system focused mostly 
on making some of its assumptions more realistic. For 
example, the Nicholson-Bailey model expanded on the 
results from the L-V system and generalized them to discrete 
generations of prey and predators (the L-V system was 
developed under the assumption of continuous overlapping 
generations). More advanced models, e.g. the Holling model 
[38], the Ivlev model [39], and the Watt model [40] 
remained in the reality set by the Lotka-Volterra model, 
changing and adjusting only the encounter function (i.e. the 
function that binds prey and predator densities together with 
time, providing the dynamics of the encounter rates between 
interacting individuals).  
A proper integration of the existing models into the field 
of cybersecurity will likely involve a revision of the 
assumptions of different models of antagonistic interactions 
and relating them to the specific features of communication 
networks. Specific comparisons are necessary to elucidate 
the shared features and assumptions at the interface of 
biological and cyber systems – such comparative analysis 
can then identify models that are the most accurate in 
describing cyber reality with respect to the antagonistic 
interactions. 
 
4.3 Antagonistic (parasitic) mimicry: Batesian mimicry 
Even without clear exploitation of material resources of the 
hosts, parasitism can be present if information 
content/reliability is being exploited by one organism at the 
expense of the costs born by the other organism [41]. One 
well-documented example of such behavior is parasitic 
mimicry, which is relatively inexpensive to the mimicking 
organism as it is not associated with weapons/toxins this 
organism is pretending to have [42]. A well-known example 
is the Chrysotoxum festivum hoverfly that resembles toxic 
and stinging insects from the Hymenoptera group. By 
expressing warning colors the hoverfly avoids being 
attacked and eaten, and on the other hand it does not have to 
invest resources in actually having a sting. 
Parasitic (Batesian) mimicry, due to its inexpensive nature, 
could readily be used in security applications in cyber 
systems. The mimic could be the security algorithm that 
could adopt some features of the actual hostile software to 
approach it and infiltrate without being detected [41]. Most 
existing models of Batesian mimicry operate on the balance 
between costs of being detected and the benefits of 
expressing certain masking phenotypes. Such models could 
be used to derive parameter ranges that ensure full masking 
in the cyber-ecosystem at the expense of the lowest possible 
resource allocation. 
4.4. Non-antagonistic interactions 
Non-antagonistic interactions are more difficult to classify 
and organize, mostly because they combine intra- and inter-
species processes. There exists no single model of 
synergistic interactions similar to the seminal Lotka-
Volterra model; however, we have several ways of 
expressing the dynamics of such interactions 
mathematically. Non-antagonistic interactions that play 
major roles in development of cybersecurity solutions 
encompass all of the above sexual selection/mate choice 
processes, and symbiotic interactions. Both have the 
potential to substantially inform efforts to develop effective 
cybersecurity strategies; both also remain largely unstudied 
on a large, inter-species comparative level and thus are 
attractive targets of comparative biological research. 
4.5 Symbiotic interactions 
Symbiosis is thought to underlie all life on Earth as, 
according to the endosymbiosis hypothesis, all eukaryotic 
cells are descendants of several prokaryotic organisms that 
merged together as symbionts, which gave rise to currently 
observed organelles such us chloroplasts and mitochondria 
[43]. Currently the most commonly known and well-studied 
examples of such interactions may serve as good models to 
derive mathematical parameters that can be used in 
developing cybersecurity solutions. From an evolutionary 
perspective, the symbiotic interactions can be readily 
modelled using the same mathematical reasoning as the one 
used in the Lotka-Volterra system, by modifying parameters 
of the equations so that interacting units benefit each other 
instead of harming [44]. 
From the point of view of cybersecurity applications, 
symbiotic interactions may potentially play roles in two 
scenarios. For one, symbionts in a cyber-ecosystem could 
be used to strengthen the protective/immunizing effects of 
applied techniques. Multiple symbiotic entities could 
enforce each others’ defensive strategies and achieve fuller 
protection of the whole system. On the other hand, 
symbiotic interactions are intricately associated with other 
close interactions. In fact, the Lotka-Volterra-like model of 
symbiotic interactions [44] predicts that they can easily turn 
into parasitic interactions if conditions shift in the 
environment of symbionts (e.g. if available resources 
become more asymmetrically exploited by one of the 
symbionts). Thus, such models are also able to provide a 
testing space where a range of parameters that maintain the 
beneficial symbiotic interactions could be tested. In fact, 
such models can also be used to derive alternative scenarios 
of fighting cyber parasites – if it is possible to “mutate” 
them and modify their responsiveness to the environment – 
changing a parasitic interaction into a symbiotic one with an 
artificially introduced additional organism [45]. 
A special case of synergistic interactions occurs in 
cooperating organisms when individuals bear costs (often 
the highest fitness costs, i.e. by postponing/entirely 
abandoning reproduction) and benefit other individuals by 
helping them (usually in the form of raising their offspring) 
[27]. The dynamics of such interactions is best known in the 
altruistic forms of cooperation, where it is predicted and 
described by the Hamilton inequality [46] that binds costs 
of the donor, benefit of the receiver, and their coefficient of 
relatedness that defines how costs and benefits are balanced 
on both sides of the interaction [46], [47]. In the context of 
this project, however, it is of a marginal importance – much 
more important kinds of cooperating interactions will be 
those encountered between non-related individuals. Such 
non-kin cooperation can easily be incorporated in our 
system (as reciprocal sharing of costs and achieved 
benefits), however this field of ecology is still strongly 
underrepresented and no quantitative models exist that 
could be used and developed in the context of the proposed 
project. 
4.6 Sexual selection 
From the point of view of cybersecurity, sexual selection 
may be the most difficult but also the most potent 
interaction that could be exploited [48]. The biggest 
difficulty comes from the fact that sexual selection operates 
through choice of the most suitable mates and thus would 
require creating and maintaining a population of sexually 
reproducing entities that would use cycles of selection in 
order to evolve new, more effective ways of fighting enemy 
software [28]. It is an important question how such 
selection would operate and currently evolutionary biology 
describes two major classes of sexual selection 
mechanisms. 
The first one, called “the good genes hypothesis” poses that 
selective individuals (in nature usually females) choose 
certain partners (usually males) because they provide them 
with “good genes” that increase offspring viability and 
fitness [49]. Such indirect genetic benefits have been 
demonstrated in many animal studies and are a well-
documented, although still weakly understood phenomenon 
[28], [29]. 
The second class of sexual selection drivers falls into the 
“Fisherian runaway” category, where the preference of one 
sex (females) evolves as a self-perpetuating mechanism that 
exploits certain male traits and is fueled by a positive 
feedback loop generated by the strong genetic correlations 
between female preference and male display traits [48], 
[49]. This second form of sexual selection has also been 
suggested to occur in nature – however it is much more 
difficult to find its place in the cybersecurity reality as this 
form of sexual selection is not directly associated with any 
fitness benefits to females (apart from choosing males that 
can actually afford to have exaggerated and overgrown 
traits). 
Both models of sexual selection are governed by one 
common mathematical model [50] that integrates female 
preference (P), male display (D) and residual fitness effects 
(F). If we denote variance and covariance of specific traits 
as V and C (e.g. V(P) – variance in preference; C(PD) – 
covariance between display and preference), b_s and b_n as 
respective selection gradients resulting from sexual (s) and 
natural (n) selection, the joint dynamics of these traits may 
be described as: 
Δ(
?̅?
?̅?
?̅?
) = (
𝑉(𝐷) 𝐶(𝑃𝐷) 𝐶(𝐹𝐷)
. 𝑉(𝑃) 𝐶(𝐹𝑃)
. . 𝑉(𝐹)
) × ([
𝑏_𝑛(𝐷)
𝑏_𝑛(𝑃)
𝑏_𝑛(𝐹)
] +
[
𝑏_𝑠(𝐷)
𝑏_𝑠(𝑃)
𝑏_𝑠(𝐹)
]) + (
𝑢(𝐷)
𝑢(𝑃)
𝑢(𝐹)
), 
where u denotes respective changes in phenotypes’ 
values due to mutation. Different combinations of 
parameters of this model yield different modes of sexual 
selection, and exploration of these values within the ranges 
that are realistic to cyber systems will help uncover types of 
interactions that would be the most efficient in cybersecurity 
applications. 
V. POTENTIAL BIO-INSPIRED RESEARCH DIRECTIONS FOR 
CYBERSECURITY 
After defining key terms related to cybersecurity ecology, 
and describing most important models that characterize 
interactions between organisms in nature, the next step is to 
develop a “procedure” that will result in the potential new 
research directions. The steps of such a procedure related to 
interactions are illustrated in Fig. 3. 
First, it is important to map existing offensive/defensive 
measures as well as interactions in both types of ecosystems. 
From the biology perspective this includes performing 
rigorous meta-analyses describing comparatively and 
phylogenetically the diversity of defense/offense 
mechanisms present in nature and their complexity (e.g. 
their costs, the most optimal uses, their diversity at various 
level of life organization). 
 
In the next step, the missing components in the virtual world 
that could be potentially ported from nature should be 
identified. All of the most promising candidates that do not 
have counterparts in cyber space will form a list of most 
suitable bio-inspirations. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Comparing interactions and components between ecology 
and cybersecurity ecology. 
 
In the last step, it is also possible to identify security-
related components that exist in cybersecurity but that are 
not sufficiently effective. Then, insights from mechanisms 
and relationships that exist in nature could provide important 
feedback on how these security techniques could be 
improved. 
To summarize, we believe that currently the most 
promising research directions include: 
 Drawing further inspirations from the particular 
organism’s characteristic feature/defense mechanism. 
For example, such features like aposematism (warning 
signal that is associated with the unprofitability of a prey 
item to potential predators) or autotomy (where an 
animal sheds or discards one or more of its own body 
parts to elude or distract the predator) could readily 
become an inspiration for future cybersecurity solutions. 
 Careful investigation and applying knowledge from the 
mentioned nature-based interactions. As already 
observed the malware-host scenario is more similar to 
parasite-host than to predator-prey association. 
Therefore, more research attention should be turned to 
the models and achievements of biology in this field. 
This could provide many new, interesting insights. 
Another research direction that we believe has not been 
sufficiently explored is sexual interactions where e.g. the 
methods to become an attractive/unattractive target could 
be analyzed. 
 Comparative analysis of the features of parasitic and 
predatory systems that expose their common underlying 
mechanisms leading to their description within the 
natural enemy framework. Such common properties of 
these antagonistically interacting systems may be the 
most effective points (in a way identified by long 
evolutionary history of such systems) where new 
approaches to cybersecurity can be developed. The most 
promising avenues in this group of issues include (i) 
induced/anticipatory mechanisms that lower the costs of 
maintaining active defense mechanisms; (ii) enemy-
driven facilitation – which, by exploiting multiple 
enemies, may lead to the establishment of reinforcement 
mechanisms that increase the effectiveness of enemy 
elimination; (iii) transmission threshold management 
which can provide tools to minimize the effort in 
eliminating threats, while maximizing the achieved 
security gain. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents a systematic ecology-based approach to 
cybersecurity. Based on the observation of the significant 
fragmentation of achievements and knowledge in the field of 
bio-inspired cybersecurity, we propose a cyber-ecosystem, 
cybersecurity ecology, and related terminology that may be 
used to study offensive/defensive mechanisms and 
interactions among cyber-organisms and/or between cyber-
organisms and their environment. In our opinion this helps 
to identify new potential future research directions for bio-
inspired cybersecurity. 
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